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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JERRY RICKETTS,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,

Case No. 88-0208-CA

vs,
V & H LEASING SERVICES, INC.
a Wisconsin corporation,
Defendant and
Respondent.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
APPEAL FROM THE ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, CIVIL NO.
39279, THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS CORNABY PRESIDING.

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 4A of the
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals and pursuant to an Order of
Transfer from the Supreme Court of the State of Utah.
Jerry Ricketts appeals from an Order denying his Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and granting the Motion for Summary
Judgment of V & H Leasing Services Inc., (V & H).

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ON APPEAL
Is an owner/lessor who retains no control over a vehicle,
is not benefited by its use, does not select the maintenance
contractor, nor provide liability insurance, liable to a third
party for the lessee's failure to maintain the vehicle's
parking brake.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case arises out of personal injuries to Jerry Ricketts
allegedly resulting from a faulty parking brake on a truck owned
by V & H, but leased to Swanson Building Materials ("Swanson").
On November 24, 1987, Judge Cornaby granted V & H's Motion for
Summary Judgment and denied Mr. Ricketts' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment.

R. 189.

On August 15, 1980, V & H, a leasing company located in
Marshfield, Wisconsin, leased a new 1980 Ford F700D truck to
Mr. Ricketts' employer, Swanson Building Materials, on a 60
month Business Net Lease Agreement.

Swanson used the truck in

its construction business in Utah.

The lease required Swanson

to provide liability insurance as well as to maintain the truck
and make repairs.

R. 103-108.

The lease stated in pertinent

part:
MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS.
(a) Lessee, at the expense of Lessee, shall
maintain each vehicle and each part thereof in good
working order and condition, properly serviced and
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lubricated, and make all necessary repairs and
replacements thereto . . . .
R. 107.
V & H did not send a representative from its place of business in Wisconsin to Utah to inspect or maintain the truck after
Swanson took delivery of the truck in Wisconsin on August 15,
1980.

Nor did V & H have any knowledge of any alleged failure

by Swanson Building Materials to maintain the truck until after
Mr. Ricketts filed his lawsuit more than four and one-half years
into the five year lease period.

V & H still has no knowledge

as to whether any alleged failure to maintain the truck proximately caused the accident.

R. 103-104.

The operations manager for Swanson, Eric Eichbauer, was
responsible for maintaining the truck in question and testified
in his deposition as follows:
Q.

Now, if I understand you correctly, it was the
responsibility of Swanson to do the maintenance
or repairs on the trucks?

A.

You bet.

Q.

In other words, if there was something wrong with
the parking brake, it was the responsibility of
Swanson to get it fixed?

A.

Well, it was directly the driver's responsibility
to come in and let me know, and then it was my
responsibility to schedule the truck in to go
down for servicing.

Q.

When you got it out here, you were responsible
for the repair of the brakes or any other repairs
that the truck needed?
-3-

A.

As I stated, if the driver made me aware, as
Operations Manager, the overall responsibility
was mine, yes, sir.

Q.

And you didn't charge it back to V & H did you?

A.

No, we did not. Not after normal warranty. Even
then, that would be handled by Ford Motor, not
V & H.

Eichbauer Deposition, pp. 21-23.
On or about February 27, 1985, Mr. Ricketts was working for
Swanson at a job site in Bountiful, Utah.

The truck rolled

backwards allegedly due to a faulty parking brake and pinned
Mr. Ricketts' arm against another vehicle.

Just before the

accident, the truck was being driven by another Swanson
employee while Mr. Ricketts was guiding that driver in a
backing maneuver.

R. 83-87.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Swanson admits that it was responsible for maintaining the
truck.

Assuming arguendo that Swanson was negligent in its

maintenance work, the mere fact of ownership is insufficient to
impute Swanson's negligence to V & H.
There is no evidence in the record that V & H, four and
one-half years after it transferred the vehicle to Swanson, had
any notice that Swanson was not properly maintaining the truck.
Furthermore, nothing short of a personal trip from Wisconsin to
Utah to inspect the truck thoroughly could have revealed a
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possible problem.

Under the standard of "reasonableness" V &

H's duty toward a third party such as Mr. Ricketts could never
stretch so far.
ARGUMENT
MERE OWNERSHIP IS NOT SUFFICIENT AS A MATTER
OF LAW TO HOLD A LESSOR LIABLE TO THIRD
PARTIES FOR THE LESSEE'S NEGLIGENCE.
As a general rule, a lessor cannot as a matter of law, be
held liable for the lessee's negligence.

"If the owner is not

present in the car, but has entrusted it to a driver who is not
his servant, there is merely a bailment, and there is usually
no basis for imputing the driver's negligence to the owner.
Prosser & Keaton on The Law of Torts, § 73, p. 523-24 (5th
Ed.); Forrester v. Kuck, 579 P.2d 756 (Mont. 1978); Siverson v.
Martori, 119 Ariz. 440, 581 P.2d 285 (1978); Nava v. Truly
Nolan Exterminating, 140 Ariz. 497, 683 P.2d 296 (1984).
Plaintiff's claim against V & H sounds in strict liability
because it is based solely on the fact that V & H owned the
vehicle in question.

Plaintiff's argument is a radical depar-

ture from established Utah law.

As the Utah Supreme Court

noted recently:
As a general rule, ownership of a motor vehicle does
not alone subject the owner to liability for the negligence of permissive users.
Lane v. Messer, 731 P.2d 488, 491 (Utah 1986).

The Utah Supreme Court noted that the only exceptions to
the foregoing rule are when an owner permits a minor to drive a
vehicle, negligently entrusts a vehicle to another, or the owner
knows or should know of an unsafe condition of the vehicle.
Id. at 491.

Of the foregoing exceptions to the rule, the only

one which could possibly apply in this case would be whether V
& H knew or should have known of an unsafe condition of the
truck.

The record is clear that V & H did not have actual

knowledge of any unsafe condition.

Thus, the only issue before

this court is whether V & H should have known of an unsafe
condition.

The record is without any such evidence.

V & H operates out of Marshfield, Wisconsin.

Four and

one-half years of the five year lease had expired by the time
of the accident.

Under the Business Net Lease Agreement,

Swanson, as the lessee, assumed responsibility for all maintenance and insurance.

Swanson readily admits its responsibility.

Thus, both parties to the leasing contract clearly understood
its terms.

Plaintiff cannot sue the lessee, Swanson, because

it was his employer.

That fact has lead to this attempt to

overreach the bounds of established law.
Every court which has addressed a similar factual situation
had refused, as a matter of law, to hold the lessor liable to
third parties for the lessee's negligent maintenance.

The only

exception is a case cited by plaintiff where the court found an
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agency relationship between the owner and operator who was
responsible for the truck's maintenance.

Kaley v. Catalina

Yachts, 232 Cal. Rep. 384 (Cal. App. 1986).

There is no

evidence in the case at hand of employee sharing or anything
else which would make Swanson the agent of V & H for purposes
of maintaining the truck.

Thus, the Kaley case is unpersuasive.

Courts addressing a bailment or lease situation similar to
that at hand, however, have all ruled as a matter of law in
favor of V & H's position.

Even a case cited in Mr. Ricketts*

brief supports V & H's argument.

Wilcox v. Glover Motors,

Inc., 269 N. Carolina 473, 153 S.E.2d 76 (1967).

In Wilcox,

defendant Doranne Anders was test driving a used vehicle owned
by defendant Glover Motors, when an accident occurred.

The

court found that a bailment had been created by the test drive.
The court stated that although the statutory duty to maintain
operative brakes rested on both the owner and the operator of
the vehicle, negligence of one party in that regard would not
be imputed to the other:
The burden is upon the plaintiff to prove that the
bailor at the time that he allowed the vehicle to
leave his possession for such purpose, knew, or in the
exercise of reasonable care and inspection of the
vehicle should have known, that the brakes were
defective. . . . The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
does not apply to a brake failure several hours and
many miles after the delivery of the car to the
bailee.
Id. at 83.

-7-

Mr. Ricketts cites Wilcox for the proposition that both the
owner and the operator have a duty to maintain.

That may be

true, but in the absence of any evidence that V & H knew or
should have known of a problem with the parking brake, summary
judgment should be affirmed.
In Forrester, supra., the court granted summary judgment in
favor of the owner-lessor.

There, the owner leased five trucks

to the plaintiff's employer.

Plaintiff's employer was required

to repair and maintain the trucks and provide liability insurance just as in the case at hand.

The facts established that

the lessee, plaintiff's employer, had absolute control over the
use of the trucks which were engaged solely in the employer's
business.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of

the owner-lessor which was affirmed on appeal.

The appellate

court held that liability for the negligent use of a vehicle
cannot be predicated against the owner at common law merely
because he owns the vehicle.
The case at hand should have the same result.

V & H had

relinquished possession of the truck to Swanson four and onehalf years before the accident.
& H.

Swanson was not an agent of V

Mr. Ricketts alleges, however, that because Swanson, his

employer, may have negligently maintained the truck, V & H is
responsible.

Plaintiff's argument is unsupported by case law

and directly contradicts the plain language of the lease

-ft-

agreement which was clearly understood by the contracting
parties.
Nava, supra., is in accord.

There, an airplane owner,

Truly Nolan, had engaged the services of a Mr. Apodaca to
repair the airplane.

After completing the repairs, Apodaca

recommended a test flight which Truly Nolan authorized.

The

plane crashed after take-off killing the pilot and a passenger.
The crash was allegedly caused by the absence of counterweights
on the plane's elevators.

Plaintiff alleged the owner, Truly

Nolan, was vicariously liable for the negligence of the pilot
and was negligent in failing to discover and warn the pilot of
a dangerous condition, i.e., the absence of the counterweights.
While the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff,
the trial court entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict in
favor of the airplane owner because there was not an agency
relationship between the owner and the pilot or the repairman.
The court noted that the Restatement defines "Agency" as:
. . . the fiduciary relation which results from the
manifestation of consent by one person to another that
the other shall act in his behalf and subject to his
control, and consent by the other to so act.
Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 1 (1958).

The court held

that a bailment had been created rather than an agency stating
that the primary distinction between an agency and a bailment
is the bailee's freedom from control by the bailor and the
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inability of the bailee to subject the bailor to liability in
contract or tort.

Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 12,

Comment C (1958).
In the case at hand, there is no evidence whatsoever of any
agency relationship between V & H and Swanson.

Swanson was

never acting on behalf of V & H nor subject to its control.

A

mere bailment arose which is insufficient as a matter of law to
subject V & H to liability for Swanson's negligence.

See also

Siverson, supra., (as a matter of law, the owner-bailor of the
vehicle is not liable to a bailee or a third person for a
dangerous condition which arises after delivering the vehicle
to the bailee.)
V & H does not deny that it owned the truck.

Nor does V &

H deny that the Utah Code requires vehicles to have adequate
parking brakes.1

Neither the Utah Code nor the case law,

however, makes the owner strictly liable as plaintiff suggests.
An owner is liable for brake failure only if the owner's
conduct is unreasonable under the circumstances.

White v.

x

Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-145(b) (1979) states:
Every motor vehicle and combination of vehicles shall have
a parking brake system adequate to hold the vehicle or
combination on any grade on which it is operated under all
conditions of loading on a surface free from snow, ice or
loose material or which shall comply with performance
standards issued by the department.
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Pinney, 108 P.2d 249 (Utah 1940); Hall v, Warren, 632 P.2d 848,
851 (Utah 1981); Little America Refining Co, v. Leyba, 641 P.2d
112 (Utah 1982); Maloney v. Rath, 71 Cal. Rep. 897, 445 P.2d
513 (1968).
The record is undisputed in the case at hand that the truck
was new when delivered to Swanson.

Swanson had exclusive con-

trol of the truck and it was used solely for Swanson's benefit.
Swanson clearly understood its contractual responsibility to
insure and maintain the truck.

V & H had no notice of any

maintenance problems before or after the time of delivery.
Other cases relied upon by plaintiff stand for nothing more
than the proposition that a vehicle owner who is also the
operator of the vehicle has the duty of reasonably maintaining
the vehicle.

The rationale is that the owner is the party

primarily benefited by the vehicle's use; he selects the contractor for maintenance and insures against liability.

Those

cases are inapposite here because, the owner, V & H, was not
the operator nor the party benefited by the truck's use,

V & H

did not select the maintenance contractor or insure the truck.
Mr. Ricketts' brief is a tortured and misleading interpretation of statute and case law.

All of the statutes and cases

are in accord that V & H is not liable to plaintiff without
evidence of one of the following:

-11-

1.

An agency relationship between V & H and Swanson;

2.

Defective brakes at the time of delivery to Swanson; or

3.

V & H knew or should have known of Swanson's alleged

negligent maintenance.
There is no evidence in the record to support any of the
foregoing theories.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, V & H respectfully requests that
the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of V & H
be affirmed.
DATED this $T

day of May, 1988.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By (Jk^t J^K^a^JZ^
^yOL. Sanders
Attorneys for Defendant V & H
SCMJLS258
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